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ing the Common Purchaser Act still exist, the act's jurisdictional base is
all but gone-quite a different matter. Perhaps, this is a new species of
situation in which courts should refuse to enforce a statute so emasculated
aInd should return the- problem to the legislature, by analogy to what
courts do with a statute that is unintelligible as written.31 Though the
Texas Common Purchaser Act itself remains intelligible, the means of
effecting its intended purpose are rendered unintelligible by the interven-
tion of the federal government. John J. Kendrick, Jr.
Unseaworthiness - Recovery by Longshoreman for Injuries
Caused by Defective Shore-Based Equipment
The plaintiff, a stevedore employed by Continental Grain Co., was in-
jured while unloading grain from a barge which was owned by Federal
Barge Lines, Inc. and chartered by Gulf-Canal Lines, Inc. The plaintiff sued
Federal and Gulf for damages based on unseaworthiness' and the defend-
ants filed a third-party complaint against Continental. The injury resulted
from an alleged defect in a marine leg, a mechanical elevator device, owned
by Continental. The leg was permanently attached to the dock and power
for operating it was supplied by shore-based facilities." The district court
a" An unintelligible statute is invalid and will not be enforced. Weeds, Inc. v. United States,
255 U.S. 109 (1921); Christy-Dolph v. Gragg, 59 F.2d 766 (W.D. Tex. 1932); Eubanks v. State,
203 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) error ref.; Railroad Comm'n v. Fort Worth & D.C. Ry.,
161 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) error ref. w.m.
'The plaintiff also alleged that the failure of Continental to supply goggles in compliance with
the Safety and Health Regulations for Longshoring, 29 C.F.R. § 9.1 (1958), rendered the barge
unseaworthy. This Note, however, will deal only with the allegation of unseaworthiness based on
the defective marine leg. It is interesting to note that the exact question of whether a defective
marine leg can cause a Vessel to be unseaworthy has previously been before the Supreme Court. The
question, however, was avoided by holding that the old ship used to store grain was not a vessel,
but a "mobile warehouse" and therefore not warranted to be seaworthy. Roper v. United States,
368 U.S. 20 (1961). A barge, the vessel in this case, is within the warranty of seaworthiness. The
Robert v. Parsons, 191 U.S. 17 (1903).
'The unloading operation, as described by the court of appeals in Deffes, is performed in four
stages:
(I) The marine leg is introduced through the open hatch of the barge into the grain,
and grain is, in effect, 'dug' out by buckets on the conveyor belt. During this stage,
there is no contact with the barge. (2) Large scoops, generally called "air buckets,"
operated by means of pulleys and cables, are utilized to bring the grain from the
ends of the barge to the marine leg. The pulleys are attached to the barge at various
places by means of hooks and are connected with the marine leg by cables. All this
equipment is stored in the marine leg when not in use. (3) When the grain level has
been lowered sufficiently, the air buckets are detached and stored and small bulldozers
serving essentially the same purpose as the air buckets are brought into use. (4) The
last phase of the process is the "sweeping up," during which stevedores sweep up the
grain and shovel it into the marine leg. At this stage, the marine leg rests on the
bottom of the barge. The injury occurred during the last phase of the unloading.
Deffes v. Federal Barge Lines, Inc., 361 F.2d 422, 423 (5th Cir. 1966).
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decided in favor of the defendants. It found that, since the equipment was
not traditionally a part of the ship's appurtenant appliances and equip-
ment, the defect in the marine leg could not create an unseaworthy condi-
tion.' Held, reversed and remanded: A defective marine leg-used in un-
loading grain makes a barge unseaworthy. Defies v. Federal Barge Lines,
Inc., 361 F.2d 422 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 969 (1966).
I. EXPANSION OF UNSEAWORTHINESS
The originally exclusive seaman's remedy of maintenance and cure4 has
been supplemented by a statutory remedy for negligence' and a judicial
remedy for unseaworthiness.' This judicial remedy places a duty on the
shipowner to provide a ship reasonably fit for its purpose. The early doc-
trine was limited by restrictions based on contract and negligence law, an-
alogous to the common law principles of employer'§ liability. Today, in
spite of considerable disapproval, the shipowner's obligation to provide a
ship free from unseaworthy defects is absolute and liability is "neither
limited by conceptions of negligence, nor contractual in character.""
Seamen, the "wards of admiralty," have traditionally been treated with
special concern in American courts,8 but this paternalistic attitude has
been extended during the twentieth century to a variety of maritime work-
ers other than seamen. The right of these workers to sue for unseaworth-
iness developed by an interesting evolution of case law. In 1917 the Su-
preme Court decided that a stevedore injured on board ship could not re-
aDeffes v. Federal Barge Lines, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 719 (E.D. La. 1964).
" Maintenance and cure has been analogized to accident and health insurance. See GILMORE &
.BLACK, ADMIRALTY 254 (1957). The following items arc recoverable under maintenance and cure:
(1) maintenance, which is a living expense; (2) cure, which covers nursing and medical expenses,
and (3) wages. The seaman, however, is not fully compensated for his injuries because his right to
maintenance and cure ends when he has been "so far cured as possible." Farrell v. United States,
336 U.S. 511, 518 (1949).
'Jones Act, 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. S 688 (1958).
' The first applications of the unseaworthiness doctrine related to a seaman's excuse for desertion
and marine insurance. As to desertion, see Dixon v. The Cyrus, 7 Fed. Cas. 755 (D.C. Penn. 1789);
Rice v. The Polly & Kitty, 20 Fed. Cas. 666 (D.C. Penn. 1789); The Moslem, 17 Fed. Cas. 894
(S.D.N.Y. 1846). This early doctrine was based on an implied contractual obligation on the part
of the shipowner to provide a seaworthy ship. It excused the seaman from performance under un-
usually dangerous conditions and allowed recovery for wages under the contract of employment.
As to the doctrine in early marine insurance, see The Southwark, 191 U.S. 1 (1903); The Silvia,
171 U.S. 462 (1898); The Caledonia, 157 U.S. 124 (1895); and 1 PARSONS, MARINE INSURANCE,
367-400 (1868).
'Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 549 (1960). For a historical development of
the shipowner's absolute liability, as it was divorced from negligence law, see Note, 15 Sw. L.J.
328 (1961). Opposing this extension is the dissent in Mi/chell, 362 U.S. at 550-73, by Justices
Frankfurter, Harlan, and Whittaker.
'Mr. Justice Story first expressed this view in Hardin v. Gordon, 11 Fed. Cas. 480 (C.C.D.
Me. 1823), when he delineated: "Every court should watch with jealousy an encroachment upon
the rights of seamen, because they are unprotected and need counsel; because they are thoughtless
and require indulgence; because they are credulous and complying; and are easily overreached ....
They are emphatically the wards of admiralty." Id. at 485.
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cover workmen's compensation benefits provided by state law.' To compen-
sate for the denial of this remedy, the Court held in 1926 that a stevedore
injured on ship because of negligence on the part of his fellow servant was
entitled to recover from his employer under the Jones Act.1" Mr. Justice
Holmes stated that the term "seaman" should be construed to include a
stevedore on the theory that "the work upon which the plaintiff was en-
gaged was a maritime service formerly rendered by the ship's crew."" The
following year Congress enacted the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Act"2 which provided a type of workmen's compensation for maritime
workers and excluded all other remedies against their employers. 3 Though
the need to call a stevedore a seaman no longer existed, this convenient
twisting of words later proved disadvantageous to the shipowner.
One of the most significant developments in the law of admiralty occur-
red in the case of Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki." The Supreme Court al-
lowed recovery against the shipowner based on unseaworthiness for an
injury caused by a defective boom on board the ship despite the following
facts: (a) Sieracki's employer was not the shipowner, but rather an inde-
pendent contractor; (b) Sieracki was a longshoreman, not a seaman; (c)
the shipowner was not negligent; and (d) Sieracki could have recovered
workmen's compensation from his employer. The Court rationalized that
the shipowner's absolute liability for unseaworthiness extended "to all
within the range of its humanitarian policy."" Since historically the work
of loading and unloading a vessel was done by the ship's crew, a stevedore
performing this work was within the contemplated range. As the Court
noted, "for these purposes he (the stevedore) is, in short, a seaman because
he is doing a seaman's work and incurring a seaman's hazards."' 6 Having
once called a stevedore a seaman, it was easy for the Court to extend to this
land-based "seaman" a seaman's remedy for unseaworthiness. The dissent
was based on the proposition that the real risks of unseaworthiness arise
when the vessel is on the high seas and not while safely docked in port.'"
'Southern Pac. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
1" International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U.S. 50 (1926). The Jones Act was enacted
in 1920, see note 5 supra.
" International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U.S. 50, 52 (1926). Commenting on Haverty,
Mr. Justice Cardozo later remarked, "verbal niceties were bent to the overmastering purpose of the
act to give protection to workers injured upon ships." Warner v. Goltran, 293 U.S. 155, 156 (1934).
1244 Stat. 1424, 1426-27, 1429, 1431-32, 1434-46 (1927), as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 901-50
(1964). Hereafter referred to as the Harbor Workers' Act.
"'Under § 5 of the act, the statutory compensation became the maritime worker's exclusive
remedy against his employer. However, under S 33 a seaman could still bring actions against third
parties, such as an action for unseaworthiness against the shipowner.
''328 U.S. 85 (1946), 34 CALIF. L. REv. 601.
"Id. at 95.
"ld. at 99.
"7 For a discussion of the distinctions between the risks faced by a seaman and a longshoreman,
see Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 423 (1953).
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II. CONFLICT IN THE CIRCUITS
SierackJ opened the door to a continual expansion of the unseaworthiness
doctrine. This expansion has caused much confusion and controversy in
admiralty law. Modern humanitarian considerations and the effect of mod-
ern labor methods on the unseaworthiness doctrine have led to a division
among the courts. The remedy has been extended to other types of work-
ers," provided they are performing a ship's service. A further extension
which has caused considerable conflict among the circuits involves the dif-
ferent types of equipment used in the loading and unloading process which
are subject to the warranty of seaworthiness. The myriad factual situations
which can and have arisen make it difficult for any uniform principles to be
established. Adding to this difficulty is the fact that there is a scarcity of
definitive case law by the Supreme Court.
Aftermath of Sieracki. The two cases decided by the Supreme Court
after Sieracki which are used in any argument involving the extension of
the unseaworthiness doctrine to include different types of equipment are
Petterson v. Alaska S.S. Co."' and Rogers v. United States Lines.'° In Pet-
terson the Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit's holding that the ship-
owner was liable to a stevedore who was injured when a snatch block, not
part of the ship's equipment,"' broke when put to proper use. This decision
abolished a limitation established in several circuits" whereby the ship's
owner was not liable for an injury occurring while control of the ship, or
that part where unseaworthiness arose, was relinquished to an independent
contractor. The Court interpreted Sieracki as placing an absolute duty on
the shipowner whether or not he has relinquished control of his ship or a
part thereof.
In Rogers the Supreme Court held that a defective land fall runner, used
to unload cargo, caused the ship to be unseaworthy' in face of the facts
that (a) the alleged unseaworthy condition was not created by the ship;
(b) the runner was owned, produced, and operated by the independent
" See Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, supra note 17 (carpenters); American S.S. Co. v. Copp,
245 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1957) (riggers); Torres v. The Kaster, 227 F.2d 664 (2d Cir. 1955)
(shipcleaners); Feinman v. A. H. Bull S.S. Co., 216 F.2d 393 (3d Cir. 1954) (electricians);
Read v. United States, 201 F.2d 758 (3d Cir. 1953) (repairman).
9205 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 396 (1954), 53 MicH. L. REV.
126.20 205 F.2d 57 (3d Cir. 1953), rev'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 984 (1954). There are many cases
which, to a lesser degree, illustrate the tendency towards increasing the situations wherein the ship-
owner is held absolutely liable for injuries to longshoremen engaged in the "ship's service." These
cases fall within the outer boundaries of liability as established by Petierson and Rogers, which have
extended Sieracki the farthest as to what equipment is warranted to be seaworthy.
"' This fact was one of the main reasons why Justices Burton, Frankfurter, and Jackson dis-
sented. Alaska S.S. Co. v. Petterson, 347 U.S. 396, 401 (1954).
"See Lopez v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 201 F.2d 418 (3d Cir. 1953); Lynch' v. United
States, 163 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1947).
sa 347 U.S. 984 (1953) (per curiam opinion reversing the Third Circuit).
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stevedoring company in full control of the unloading operation; (c) the
shipowner did not sanction its use or even know of its existence; and (d)
there was no basis for concluding that the vessel had adopted the runner as
an appurtenance." Three justices dissented on the ground that Sieracki did
not justify the extension of the doctrine to cover "the unseaworthiness of
equipment owned and brought on board by a stevedoring contractor, '
since the stevedoring company is in a better position to prevent such haz-
ards. It should be noted, however, that while the stevedore can recover only
a limited amount from his employer under the Harbor Workers' Act," the
shipowner is allowed indemnity from the stevedoring company when the
latter's negligence causes the defect.'
Traditional Equipment Test. One question which has caused a division
among the circuits concerns the extension of the doctrine to include equip-
ment used in loading and unloading a vessel which is not traditionally a
part of the ship. Opposing such an extension are the decisions of the Second
Circuit in Forkin v. Furness Withy & Co."' and the Sixth Circuit in
McKnight v. N.M. Paterson & Sons."' Obviously disagreeing with Sier-
acki's decision and underlying rationale,'m these circuits established a test
limiting the warranty of seaworthiness to equipment traditionally a part of
the "hull, gear, stowage, appurtenant appliances and equipment" of the
vessel. By thus limiting the doctrine3' and distinguishing. Petterson and
"Rogers v. United States Lines, 205 F.2d 57, 58 (3d Cir. 1953).
"
5This theory was used by the same Justices in Alaska S.S. Co. v. Petterson; 347 U.S. at 401-02.
'Note 13 supra. He is not, however, allowed double recovery. Under the amended section 933
of the Harbor Workers' Act, 73 Stat. 391 (1959), 33 U.S.C. § 933 (Supp. II, 1961), the steve-
dore's employer is guaranteed his payments under the act if recovery is made against a third party.
"' Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956). The Supreme Court
allowed the shipowner to sue the stevedoring company for indemnity. This right of indemnity was
based upon an implied contractual obligation arising out of the stevedoring contract requiring the
company to perform the shipowner's stevedoring functions in a workmanlike manner. The steve-
doring company warrants its service as a manufacturer warrants the soundness of his product.
zs323 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1963).
29286 F.2d 250 (6th Cir. 1960), cerl. denied, 368 U.S. 913 (1961).
- The court in Forkin challenged Sieracki's premise that the work of loading and unloading had
historically been performed by the crew as being much too broad. Forkin v. Furness Withy Co.,
323 F.2d at 640. It cited as support, Tetreault, Seamen, Seaworthiness, and the Rights-of Harbor
Workers, 39 CORNELL L.Q. 381, 413-14 (1954) and Shields & Byrne, Application of the "Unsea-
worthiness" Doctrine to Longshoremen, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 1137 (1963). Mr. Byrne was one of
the losing counsel for the shipping company in Sieracki.
" The courts in McKnight and Forkin drew further distinctions to justify the limitation placed
on Sieracki. First, they tried to introduce negligence into their consideration of the seaworthiness
question-a proposition which Deffes recognized to be clearly erroneous. They inferred that the
shipowner's power of inspection, Forkin v. Furness Withy & Co., 323 F.2d at 641, or his lack of
control, McKnight v. N. M. Paterson & Sons, 181 F. Supp. at 439, have relevance to the war-
ranty of seaworthiness. This position was analyzed and rejected completely by the Supreme Court in
Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960). Second, the courts contended that liability
should not be imposed unless the injuring device is attached to or touching the ship, McKnight v.
N. M. Paterson & Sons, 181 F. Supp. at 439 and Forkin v. Furness Withy Co., 323 F.2d at 641.
Since there is no support in the Supreme Court cases for this limitation, supra notes 19, 20, Deffers
refused to accept it, even though the marine leg was attached to the barge at one stage and was at
the time of the injury touching the bottom of the barge, supra note 2.
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Rogers, the courts felt that they had found a "rational stopping place" for
the cases involved with questions of unseaworthiness. McKnight found that
the defective equipment which caused the injury in both Petterson and
Rogers was of the type commonly used as a part of the gear of both the
vessel and the stevedoring company. Once this duplicity of gear had been
established, it was easy for the court to reason that those vessels had adopted
such equipment as their own.' The McKnight court refused to allow recov-
ery for unseaworthiness of a defective crane, because a crane is not com-
inonly found among the ship's gear.' Consequently, although the steve-
dore was performing a seaman's job, he was not incurring a seaman's hazard
since he was not using equipment traditionally found on board a ship. The
Second Circuit in Forkin agreed with McKnight and held that equipment
maintained on the pier to establish connection with the ship (in this case
a baggage conveyor) was not an "appliance appurtenant to the ship" or
part of the ship's "gear." However, the court conceded that regardless of
the size or common nature of the equipment, if a defective conveyor had
been attached to the ship, a stevedore could sue for its unseaworthiness."
Traditional Work Test. Following the general trend towards greater lib-
erality in affording to injured longshoremen recourse against the ship-
owner, the Ninth and Third Circuits have extended the doctrine to include
equipment, not a traditional part of the ship, provided the worker is per-
forming work traditionally performed by the crew. In the Ninth Circuit
case of Huff v. Matson Nay. Co." a longshoreman recovered for an injury
in the hold of a vessel caused by a defective scraper which was part of the
stevedore's dockside crane (the device was similar to a marine leg). Though
no part of the ship's gear was involved, the court stated that "use of more
modern equipment can no more exculpate the shipowner from his obliga-
tions than could the use of 'more modern divisions of labor' [as in Sier-
acki]."' Similarly, the Third Circuit in Spann v. Lauritzen" followed Huff
and extended its holding considerably by allowing a stevedore damages for
the unseaworthiness of a hopper which injured him on the pier.
12 The court in McKnight relied on Fredericks v. American Export Lines, 227 F.2d 450 (2d
Cir. 1954), which was irrelevant to the question in McKnight. In Fredericks the American Export
Lines was not sued as a shipowner nor was it ever decided who owned the ship. As that court had
said, "no vessel 'was connected with the accident." Id. at 452. The claim was against the Lines
as a lessee in possession of the pier and was based upon a New York statute. The court held that
the liability of the pier owner would not extend to a defective appliance furnished on defendant's
pier by a subcontractor. This misreading of Fredericks possibly misled the McKnight court.
aThis distinction was made by ihe district court, 181 F. Supp. 434 (N.D. Ohio 1960), and
affirmed by the Sixth Circuit in McKnight, 286 F.2d 250 (6th Cir. 1960).
4 McKnight v. N. M. Paterson & Sons, 181 F. Supp. at 439. The court stated that "its
[the crane's] size and sole function rebel against any argument that a ship might 'adopt' or 'inte-
grate' such equipment as part of its gear." Ibid.
8 Forkin v. Furness Withy & Co., 323 F.2d at 641.
a338 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 943 (1965).71id. at 212-13.
3' 344 F.2d 204 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 939 (1965).
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III. FIFTH CIRCUIT ADOPTION OF THE LIBERAL TEST
The Fifth Circuit in Deffes v. Federal Barge Lines, Inc." aligned itself
with the decisions of the Third and Ninth Circuits by allowing recovery on
the ground of unseaworthiness even though a defective marine leg is not a
traditional part of a ship. The court rejected the distinction in McKnight
that the stevedore was not incurring the hazards of a seaman because none
of the traditional unloading gear of the ship (i.e., winches, masts, or booms)
were being used. The court felt there was no doubt that Deffes was within
the scope of the doctrine as loading and unloading is clearly held to be
work of the ship's service.4" The following language of the Supreme Court
in Sieracki was emphasized: "the risks themselves arise from and are inci-
dent in fact to the services . . . ."" If the stevedore is doing work tradition-
ally performed by a seaman, he is, by definition, incurring the risks incident
to that service, whether new or old equipment is used.
The Supreme Court had forecast choppy waters for the traditional part
of the ship test when it made clear in Sieracki that the shipowner, "is at
liberty to conduct his business by securing the advantages of specialization
in labor and skill brought about by modern divisions of labor. He is not
at liberty by doing this to discard his traditional responsibilities. 42 By an-
alogy, the shipowner should not be able to discard these responsibilities by
securing modern techniques of loading and unloading his ship." To allow
the owner to escape liability in such a situation would be discriminatory
against the longshoremen whose industrious employer uses faster, easier,
and safer machinery for loading and unloading the vessel.
In Deffes the court attempted to show the invalidity of the McKnight
*test by applying it literally to -the -example of a seaman injured aboard an"
atomic-powered vessel. If the seaman were injured by a defect in the re-
actor, certainly not traditional ship's gear, no cause of action could arise
for unseaworthiness. "Such a result," as the Fifth Circuit realized, "would
be completely out of harmony with the Supreme Court's conception of the
doctrine of seaworthiness."4 The Fifth Circuit also rejected the argument
in Forkin and McKnight for denying relief on the ground that the shore-
based crane (marine leg in Deffes) was not an actual part of the hull, gear,
a9361 F.2d 422 (5th Cir. 1966).
'°See Italia Societa v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 376 U.S. 315 (1964); Crumady v. The Joachim
Hendrick Fisser, 358 U.S. 423, 428 (1959); Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
"Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. at 95.
4 Id. at 100.4 3 The Ninth Circuit in Huff v. Matson Nav. Co., 338 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1964), used
this analogy to show the artificiality of the distinction in McKnight. See note 36 supra and accom-
panying text.
"Deffes v. Federal Barge Lines, 361 F.2d at 426. This strict interpretation of the traditional
ship's gear test is not indicated by the language in McKnight. When the atomic propulsion system
becomes part of the ship, obviously it would be warranted by the shipowner. However, the court's
conclusion is a logical extension of the standard, if technically construed.
1967]
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or stowage of the vessel and therefore was not within the warranty of sea-
worthiness. In reversing the court of appeals decision in Rogers, the Su-
preme Court effectively negated this limitation. As pointed out in Deffes,
the facts in this case are not distinguishable from the Rogers and Petterson
cases on any rational basis. Each case involved stevedore company equip-
ment brought on board to help with loading or unloading the ship. "The
mere fact that the marine leg is larger than a block or land fall runner
should not cause a different application of the law."'
IV. CONCLUSION
At its inception the doctrine of unseaworthiness had one central point-
the vessel involved. Because of the historical evolution of the vessel's war-
ranty of its own fitness which included the type of equipment available
at that time, this focal point was reasonable and logical. But with the ad-
vent of modern social philosophy and technology, the recent cases, includ-
ing Defies, have abandoned the ship. Instead of asking if the boat or its
equipment is seaworthy, the question now asked is whether the man was
performing a ship's service and then whether a defect in the equipment used
by him caused the injury. If so, the vessel is unseaworthy independent of
the relationship of the equipment to the boat. This test seems to be in ac-
cord with the Supreme Court's language in Pope & Talbot v. Havn' where
the Court reaffirmed Sieracki stating that "Sieracki's legal protection was
not based on the name 'stevedore' but on the type of work he did and its
relationship to the ship . . . ."' Though the mere holding that a piece of
equipment, not a part of the ship, can cause the ship to be unseaworthy
sounds inconsistent in itself, the decision in Defies is logically consistent
with language and concepts thus far enunciated by the Supreme Court. If
the worker performs a direct step involved in a ship's service, historically
performed by seamen, he should be protected by the doctrine regardless of
the type of equipment used.
In the absence of a contra indication by the Supreme Court, most courts
today do not apply the "traditional part of the ship" test, but have adop-
ted the "traditional work of a seamen" test, emphasizing the function of
the equipment used." Perhaps the reason for this change has been the con-
4 Ibid.
4'346 U.S. 406 (1953).4 1Id. at 413.
" Similar expressions of the doctrine as expressed in Defies are found among the district courts.
In Litwinowicz v. Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co., 179 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Penn. 1959), a longshoreman
was injured while working in a railroad car placing wooden "chocks" under a draft of steel beams
preparatory to their being hoisted aboard the ship. Rejecting the defendant's claim that plaintiff
was merely preparing the cargo for loading and not doing the actual loading, the court concluded
that "the term loading is not a word of art, and is not to be narrowly and hypertechnically inter-
preted. Plaintiff's actions at the time of the accident were direct, necessary steps in the physical
[Vol. 21
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fusion of the courts in defining the status of a longshoreman as a seaman
and the status of the vessel within the doctrine of unseaworthiness in light
of modern developments. As can be seen in Deffes, the lines between the
two seem to overlap to a point where the criteria for determining whether a
longshoreman is within the status of a seaman also determines the equip-
ment warranted to be seaworthy by the shipowner.
Though consistent in its logic, the definition of the doctrine in this man-
ner causes several problems in its applications. For example, the basic cause
of the conflict over the question in Deffes, that of refusal to extend the
doctrine beyond its traditional focal point, has also generated a conflict in
the circuits in an analogous situation involving use of inadequate man-
power to do maritime work. The Second Circuit, upholding the traditional
threefold concept of a sound ship, proper gear, and a competent crew, has
held that a shipowner is not liable for injury resulting from a non-negligent
order assigning insufficient manpower to a job.4 The Ninth Circuit, in ac-
cord with its broader coverage, has held that the same type of order cre-
ates a dangerous condition which renders the vessel unseaworthy."
One major problem with the Deffes definition of the doctrine is that
numerous situations could arise under this theory, which will undoubtedly
lead to less uniformity in maritime cases unless a specific standard or guide-
line is set by the Supreme Court. For instance, the stevedoring company's
equipment used to unload barges extends inland hundreds of feet and in-
volves grain handlers, truckers, railroad equipment and employees, and
administrative personnel, all of which, while performing their various
functions, could be said to be engaged in the service of the vessel since they
are assisting in various ways in the process of unloading the vessel. More
specifically, employees are scooping grain inside an elevator where the ma-
rine leg terminates, as the plaintiff was doing on the barge. The machinery
and inside personnel continue to operate while an empty barge is removed
and a full barge is placed in position for unloading. It is settled that a long-
transfer of the steel from the railroad into the vessel, which constituted the work of loading."
Litwinowicz v. Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co., supra at 817-18. And in Thompson v. Calmar S.S. Corp.,
216 F. Supp. 234 (E.D. Penn. 1963), a longshoreman recovered on the ground of unseaworthiness
when he was injured while engaged in the movement of freight cars which were propelled by the
ship's line into a position where their cargo could be loaded onto the ship. The court reasoned that
"it would not do to isolate from the over-all circumstances the fact that the plaintiff happened
to be on a loaded freight car and then plead the seemingly strange extravagance that a workman
on a freight car is held to be engaged in the traditional work of a seaman. In isolation such a plea
may sound appealing. In the circumstances it is unfounded." Thompson v. Calmar S.S. Corp., supra
at 238. After examining several cases, one district judge concluded in a case involving a seaman's
unseaworthiness suit against the shipowner for injuries caused by a defective chisel-truck owned by
the stevedoring company and brought on board the ship, "perhaps my ability to draw the line in
this situation is no better than the Maine roofer laying shingles on a day the fog was so thick he
did not realize he had gone past the edge, but I can perceive here no rational stopping place." Con-
sidine v. Black Diamond S.S. Corp., 163 F. Supp. 107, 108 (D. Mass. 1958).
"'Waldron v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 356 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1966).
so American President Lines v. Redfern, 345 F.2d 629 (9th Cir. 1965).
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shoreman, if performing a seaman's service for the ship, does not have to
be on board the ship when he is injured to recover for unseaworthiness.1
If one of the workmen in the elevator is injured while the barges are being
changed, it would seem that an action for unseaworthiness would be avail-
able, but it is not clear which barge owner should be sued.
The broader view will not only cause problems in its application, but
also in its economic effects. The theory adopted by the Fifth Circuit will
include a wide range of non-shipboard equipment. Since most defects in
this equipment will usually be caused by the negligence of its owner, the
stevedoring company, in such cases the Supreme Court has allowed indem-
nity against the stevedore's employer." But the resulting circular litigation
adds expense and unnecessary delay to the settlement of the case. By making
the third-party remedies more appealing, the courts are increasing this
problem while at the same time slighting Congress' intent to limit compen-
sation with the Harbor Workers Act.53 In the past the excess litigation has
been preferable to excluding maritime workers from seaworthiness protec-
tion; but, as the problem becomes more acute, a solution is demanded. One
possibility could be to allow the stevedore to sue his employer directly for
unseaworthiness." This exception to the exclusive remedy provision would
eliminate the cost of indemnification proceedings in cases where the em-
ployer is clearly at fault. In any case, the increasing number of seaworth-
iness damages enhances the danger of pricing the shipping industry out of
its market, because these costs are recovered through higher prices."
Jerry L. Arnold
5 Guieterrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206 (1963).
52 Supra note 28.
" Supra note 12.
54 An exception to the exclusive remedy provision of the Harbor Workers' Act would have to
be passed by Congress.
5' See Comment, Expanding the Warranty of Seaworthiness: Social Welfare or Maritime Disaster,
9 VILL. L. REV. 422, 439-40 (1964).
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